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Chapter 7  
Neoliberalising technoscience and environment:  
EU policy for competitive, sustainable biofuels 
Les Levidow, Theo Papaioannou and Kean Birch 
 
Introduction 
Since the 1990s the European Union’s biofuels policy has espoused several aims: energy security, 
greenhouse gas (GHG) savings, technology export and rural development. On these various grounds, by 
2007 the EU was moving towards statutory targets, i.e. to mandate larger markets for ‘renewable 
energy’ including biofuels. However, controversy erupted over harmful environmental and social 
effects, especially in the global South, where land-use changes were anticipating and supplying a larger 
EU market for biofuels.  
In response to the controversy, policymakers and experts focused blame on ‘conventional’ 
biofuels, as if these were a transient yet necessary phase towards sustainable biofuels. When enacted in 
2009, statutory targets were accompanied by sustainability criteria. Together these incentives and 
standards were expected to generate technoscientific innovation towards novel, more competitive and 
sustainable biofuels by using renewable resources more efficiently. Given these policy assumptions 
about benign markets fulfilling societal needs via technoscientific innovation, EU biofuel policy can 
provide a case study for relationships between neoliberalism and technoscience.  
This chapter will discuss how EU biofuels policy:  
• stimulates new markets for knowledge as well as resources; 
• assumes that markets drive beneficent innovation; and thus  
• deepens links between markets, technoscience and environment.  
The theoretical concept ‘neoliberalizing the environment’ will be extended to links between 
technoscience and natural resources.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows:  The first section discusses analytical perspectives on 
neoliberalism and technoscience; second section focuses on EU biofuel policy, examining market 
drivers and economic imaginaries; third section analyses value chains in biofuels; fourth section looks 
at expectations for a sustainability technofix; fifth section discusses controversy over EU biofuel 
targets; and Conclusion summarises the main argument. 
 
Analytical perspectives: Neoliberalism and technoscience 
To explore the above issues, the chapter draws on several analytical perspectives linking neoliberalism 
with technoscience and environment. As elaborated later in this section, such perspectives can be 
summarised and linked as follows.  
Neoliberalism is a complex process that includes ideological, economic and political dimensions, 
according to Jessop (2002: 435–54). Ideologically, neoliberalism calls for organization of economic, 
political and social relations through formally free choices of profit-seeking individual actors. 
Economically, this can happen only through expansion of a liberalized, deregulated market within and 
across national borders. Politically, neoliberalism implies the roll-back of Keynesian intervention and a 
commitment to the formal freedom of individual actors in the market.  
As a process of institutional change, neoliberalism is driven by an underlying assumption that the 
‘free market’ – conceived as natural, neutral and efficient – should be the main means to allocate 
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resources. Hence free markets must be created in order to obtain their benefits (Harvey 2005). As 
regards the environment, such putative benefits include greater efficiency in natural resource use, better 
conservation, better evaluation of environmental risks, etc. (Castree 2008).  
In neoliberal policy frameworks, ‘the market’ must be designed (or simply presumed) to optimise 
resource usage; this is done by stimulating technoscience, regulating its forms or direction, and 
distributing its societal benefits. Resource problems are attributed to market inefficiency, to be 
remedied by technological advance, stimulated and constituted by market competition. Beyond simply 
extracting and processing resources, technological innovation redesigns resources as commodities for 
appropriation and sale, especially through privatizable knowledge. Such frameworks neoliberalize the 
environment: in the name of protecting natural resources, they are more readily appropriated and turned 
into exchange value. Neoliberalism thereby promotes market competition as a driver of technoscientific 
advance that will enhance resource and thus sustainability (Birch, Levidow and Papaioannou 2010).  
Incorporating such neoliberal assumptions, EU policy frameworks promote technoscientific 
development as a key instrument for international competitiveness. Economic imaginaries represent 
future markets as benefiting a European economic community, as a basis to mobilize resources and 
policy support for such markets. This framework also represents ‘Europe’ as a single unit of market 
competition, while also promoting integration into global capital. Socio-technical imaginaries present 
eco-efficiency as reconciling economic competitiveness and environmental sustainability. Each aspect 
is elaborated in the literature survey that follows.  
Market-like rule for extending productivity and plunder 
As a central tension within neoliberalism, markets are at once redesigned and naturalized, likewise 
politically constructed and depoliticized. Neoliberal agendas generally involve the ‘mobilization of state 
power in the contradictory extension and reproduction of market(-like) rule’, argue Tickell and Peck 
(2003: 166). Through ‘market-friendly’ regulations, neoliberal policies have extended various processes 
such as privatization, marketization, commodification etc., thereby promoting competitive market 
relations (Heynen et al. 2007).  
Expressing classical economic liberalism, eighteenth-century utilitarians portrayed the market as 
the natural regulator, complementing the natural liberty of the entrepreneur to trade without 
interference. Through metaphors of machine and market, this new discourse justified the Enclosures as 
transforming agricultural land into capital, along with new institutions to police dispossession from 
common lands. Such ideas undermined the earlier discourse of ‘natural law’, meaning the natural 
justice of yeomanry living from their own labour on the land as a common societal resource (Williams 
1980: 79).  
In such ways, classical economic liberalism espoused ‘free markets’ as if the state were removing 
unnatural interference from naturally given market exchange. In practice, freedom to exploit resources 
depends on various coercive measures by the state in establishing and enforcing property rights. Such 
arrangements have been naturalized as a ‘self-regulating market’. Employers’ coercive power takes the 
form of an apparently free, competitive exchange between buyers and sellers. Yet ‘the market has been 
the outcome of a conscious and often violent intervention on the part of government which imposed the 
market organization on society for non-economic ends’ (Polanyi 2001: 258). By treating potentially 
everything as commodities to be exploited, ‘free-market’ liberalism provoked resistance against its 
destructive effects.  
In neoliberalism, by contrast to its classical precedent, market conditions are more explicitly 
constructed to optimise their beneficent role. Conditions necessary for the success of the neoliberal 
project include individual property rights that enable and ensure competition between individuals in 
‘free’ markets – i.e., where individual property rights are secured against common or social rights. 
‘Contrary to classical liberalism, neoliberals have consistently argued that their political program will 
only triumph if it becomes reconciled to the fact that the conditions for its success must be constructed, 
and will not come about “naturally” in the absence of concerted effort’ (Lave, Mirowski and Randalls 
2010: 661). 
Through a circular reasoning, an omniscient market can be adjusted to redress problems that it 
has caused. As core principles of neoliberalism,  
The Market is an artifact, but it is an ideal processor of information. 
Every successful economy is a knowledge economy. […] The Market 
(suitably re-engineered and promoted) can always provide solutions to 
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problems seemingly caused by The Market in the first place. (Lave, 
Mirowski and Randalls 2010: 662–3)  
With such expectations for the market, neoliberalism more readily justifies the exploitation of 
human and natural resources. 
The entire history of capital accumulation has depended on dispossessions which subordinate 
labour to capital and colonize natural resources (Marx 2000). In his concept of primitive accumulation, 
Marx referred to ‘the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production’. Entire 
populations were ‘forcibly torn from their means of subsistence’, thus expropriating the agricultural 
producers from the soil (Marx 1976: 875–6).  
Marx’s concept has been extended to an ongoing process called ‘accumulation by dispossession’, 
which primarily relates to the privatization of commons or shared resources (Himley 2008: 443). This 
trans-historical concept draws present-day analogies with early capitalism:  
A closer look at Marx’s description of primitive accumulation reveals a 
wide range of processes. These include the commodification and 
privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations; 
conversion of various forms of property rights (common, collective, 
state, etc.) into exclusive private property rights; suppression of rights 
to the commons; commodification of labor power and the suppression 
of alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption; 
colonial, neo-colonial and imperial processes of appropriation of assets 
(including natural resources); monetization of exchange and taxation 
(particularly of land); slave trade; and usury, the national debt and 
ultimately the credit system as radical means of primitive accumulation. 
[…] All the features which Marx mentions have remained powerfully 
present within capitalism’s historical geography up until now. (Harvey 
2003: 145) 
More generally, capital accumulation has depended upon ‘the endless commodification of human 
and extra-human nature’ (Moore 2010: 391). Although several technical improvements helped to make 
the steam engine economically viable, its success ‘was unthinkable without the vertical frontiers of coal 
mining and the horizontal frontiers of colonial and white-settler expansion in the long nineteenth 
century’ (Moore 2010: 393). Cheap or nearly free raw materials have been supplied by cheap labour, 
which remains the ultimate source of surplus value: in expending their own labour, workers produce 
greater exchange value than the cost of reproducing their labour power.  
Here lies a practical contradiction: capital-intensive technological innovation transforms living 
labour into dead labour (e.g. machinery or materials) and so increases the organic composition of 
capital, i.e. the ratio of dead labour to living labour. This may be done to reduce capital’s dependence 
on labour and to discipline the labour that remains. By reducing the proportion of living labour, 
however, innovation tendentially limits surplus value. To overcome this limit, geo-spatial expansion has 
appropriated more human and natural resources: ‘hence the centrality of the commodity frontier in 
modern world history, enabling the rapid mobilization, at low cost (and maximal coercion), of epoch-
making ecological surpluses’ (Moore 2010: 393). 
Industrialization is popularly associated with technological innovation, as if this were the crucial 
driver. 
And yet every epoch-making innovation has also marked an audacious 
revolution in the organization of global space, and not merely in the 
technics of production. […] The revolutionary achievements were made 
through plunder as much as through productivity. This dialectic of 
productivity and plunder works so long as there are spaces that new 
technical regimes can plunder cheap energy, fertile soil, rich mineral 
veins. (Moore 2010: 405)  
Thus global space must be reorganized for realizing the profitability of technological innovation.  
From that critical perspective, technoscientific innovation for more efficient resource usage 
depends upon and facilitates plunder. Conversely, greater resource usage is driven by greater efficiency, 
e.g., in extracting and processing raw materials. These causal relations operate in both directions: new 
opportunities for plunder can drive technoscientific innovation for greater productivity.  
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Techno-fixes for resource conflicts 
The tendency towards plunder is disguised, or even reversed, by a hegemonic neoliberal discourse. 
According to its promises, greater productive efficiency reduces the need for resources and so helps to 
conserve them. In a circular logic, market competition becomes an environmental saviour by 
stimulating gains in efficiency and thus sustainability. Environmentalism has been incorporated into 
models of market progress: this ‘has done far more to smooth the “roll-out” of neoliberalizations than 
attempts to dismiss or reject environmental concerns outright’ (McCarthy and Prudham 2004: 279).  
To address sustainability problems, the extension of markets has been linked with a technological 
fix, whose development ‘relies on the coercive powers of competition’. This ‘becomes so deeply 
embedded in entrepreneurial common sense, however, that it becomes a fetish belief that there is a 
technological fix for each and every problem’ (Harvey 2005: 68). Such expectations frame 
sustainability problems as a technical inefficiency, to be overcome by technoscientific innovation.  
Technoscientific innovations have been celebrated for greater efficiency, which have facilitated 
plunder, especially in the agricultural sector. Multinational corporations have successively colonized ‘a 
multitude of new spaces that could not previously be colonized either because the technology or the 
legal rights were not available’ (Paul and Steinbrecher 2003: 228–9). Since the classical enclosures of 
the eighteenth century, land access has been obtained by formally withdrawing traditional land rights 
and/or bypassing them through violence. Such enclosures have been extended by biofuel developments 
in the global South (Levidow and Paul 2010). 
As in earlier historical periods, technoscientific innovation is again promoted as means to 
alleviate competition for resources and to expand their availability, especially to avoid the conflicts 
around biofuels. Such conflicts are attributed to inefficiency or mis-management, thus diverting 
responsibility from market competition and its policy drivers (Franco et al. 2010). By historical 
analogy, ‘new efficiencies are likely to generate further economic incentives for monocultural systems 
to supply biomass to centralised biorefineries’ (Smith 2010: 120; cf. Levidow and Paul 2011).  
As indicated by the ‘biomass’ concept, natural resources are always constructed in particular 
ways. These reorient biophysical characteristics by devising new knowledge and technologies in order 
to increase productivity and thereby the accumulation of capital. For a long time, this has meant 
transforming nature into resources through commodification after extraction; this can be seen as the 
‘formal subsumption of nature’, by analogy to labour exploitation (Boyd, Prudham and Schurman 
2001).  
Resource use also increasingly involves the ‘intensification of biological productivity (i.e., yield, 
turnover time, metabolism, photosynthetic efficiency)’ — or the ‘real subsumption of nature’. Nature 
‘is (re)made to work harder, faster and better’. Yet intensification efforts cannot assume the predictable 
compliance of nature, whose biophysical characteristics may prove recalcitrant to more efficient use. So 
there is no way to ensure predictability or control of nature prior to implementing new technologies 
(Boyd, Prudham and Schurman 2001: 563–4).  
Real subsumption of nature exemplifies a wider process of neoliberalizing nature. As politics by 
other means, this process takes many forms – privatization, marketization, deregulation, reregulation, 
etc. ‘For it involves the privatization and marketization of ever more aspects of biophysical reality, with 
the state and civil society groups facilitating this and/or regulating only its worst consequences’ 
(Castree 2008: 142–3). Various ecological fixes are devised for the problem of capital accumulation – 
often in the eco-friendly name of conserving resources, but also in the name of remaking nature. 
These logics show that `neoliberalism’ is, in environmental terms, an 
apparent paradox: in giving full reign to capital accumulation it seeks to 
both protect and degrade the biophysical world, while manufacturing 
new natures in cases where that world is physically fungible. In short, 
nature’s neoliberalisation is about conservation and its two antitheses of 
destroying existing and creating new biophysical resources. (Castree 
2008: 150) 
A similar contradiction arises in techno-fixes for environmental problems: such innovations 
reconceptualize and redesign natural resources for more effective commoditization, while also 
accounting for such resources in its own market-like image.  
As a recent controversial example: Biofuels and EU targets have been promoted by new 
corporate alliances spanning several industrial sectors; they aim to restructure agriculture as a biomass 
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source for diverse industrial products, especially as opportunities for privatizable knowledge. Extra 
demands on land provoked public and expert controversy about how the necessary biomass could be 
produced sustainably (Franco et al. 2010, Levidow and Paul 2010). As a means to legitimize biofuel 
targets, sustainability has been conceptually reduced to carbon accounting. These concepts lie at the 
nexus of the Low-Carbon Economy, a policy concept fetishizing carbon cycles as the prime indicator of 
sustainability, e.g. for biofuels.  
Although claims for environmental benefits have been questioned, the biofuel controversy has 
been ‘constructed as purely physical debates’, especially about carbon accounting.  
The challenge of developing biomass energy systems to reduce carbon 
emissions is by definition a question of industrial ecology. It requires 
accounting for the flows of energy and matter (in this case especially 
carbon) throughout every step of the supply chain, from growing plants 
to harvesting, processing and transporting them to converting them to 
useful energy to the disposal of remaining ‘wastes’ which are ideally 
reused as new resources. The holistic approach of lifecycle analysis 
also lends itself to the framing of biomass within the terms of the 
dominant energy discourse of carbon cycling. (van der Horst and Evans 
2010: 180)  
Here resources are framed in the image of an accumulation regime, pursuing new commodity 
frontiers, thus projecting a particular vision of the future.  
EU policy imaginaries for technological-market progress 
The above technoscientific visions can be analysed as imaginaries – ‘representations of how things 
might or could or should be’. These may be enacted as networks of practices (Fairclough 2010: 266). 
Imaginaries have many aspects and forms, e.g. socio-technical and/or economic (Jasanoff and Kim 
2009, Jessop 2005). Innovation agendas combine socio-technical and economic imaginaries as 
complementary visions of societal progress (Levidow, Birch and Papaioannou 2012). These imaginaries 
enable and reinforce each other: economic conditions for commoditizing knowledge are presupposed by 
socio-technical progress and vice-versa. Given this circularity, techno-fixes in neoliberal imaginaries 
are powerful and difficult to contest; they can become self-fulfilling prophecies. Next such imaginaries 
will be highlighted in EU policy frameworks. 
EU innovation policy has been analysed as socio-technical imaginaries of feasible, desirable 
futures. According to a report criticizing EU policy, Science and Governance: Taking European 
Knowledge Society Seriously, prevalent imaginaries anticipate future technoscientific development as 
central to societal progress:  
Science and technology in this imaginary are staged unambiguously as 
the solution to a range of social ills, including the problematic identity 
of Europe itself. To the extent that S&T are recognised to generate 
problems, these are cast solely in the form of mistaken technological 
choices. There is no question about whose definition of society’s 
problems or needs S&T should to address, nor any prior question about 
who participated in determining what is seen to be a ‘worthwhile’ 
(commercially profitable or socially needed?) objective or outcome. 
Accordingly, the immensely normatively-loaded term ‘progress’ is 
black-boxed and its democratic examination is curtailed. (Felt and 
Wynne 2007: 80) 
As the report argues, an ‘economics of technoscientific promise’ creates beneficent expectations 
in order to attract resources – financial, human, political, etc. Such expectations conflate 
technoscientific advance with societal progress.  
It is typically simply assumed that the mere advancement to market of a 
new product, process or technology is sufficient to demonstrate genuine 
social ‘benefit’ – despite well-established understandings of market 
failures, price externalities and the motivating power of vested interests. 
(Felt and Wynne 2007: 88)  
In such ways, socio-technical imaginaries convey ‘unifying narratives of imagined and promised 
European futures, in order to justify interventions and pre-empt disruptive public responses’ (Felt and 
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Wynne 2007: 75). Such futures are deployed to promote specific policy changes and to marginalize 
dissent.  
Related to socio-technical imaginaries are economic ones, e.g. imagining the EU as an economic 
community which will share the benefits of future markets and competition. One such imaginary is the 
‘Knowledge-Based Economy’ (KBE), a policy agenda which links current markets with future ones. 
The KBE has been largely shaped by the neoliberal agenda, prioritizing knowledge that can be 
privatized. Through the KBE policy framework, the state 
is promoting the commodification of knowledge through its formal 
transformation from a collective resource (intellectual commons) into 
intellectual property (for example, in the form of patent, copyright and 
licences) as a basis for generating profits of enterprise and rents for 
individual economic entities as well as for its own fisco-financial 
benefit., though there remains scope for counter-hegemonic versions. 
(Jessop 2005: 159)  
Initially focusing on ICT, the KBE agenda has been extended to ‘the Knowledge-Based Bio-
Economy’ (KBBE), emphasizing more efficient ways to use and commoditize renewable raw materials, 
especially from novel organisms or processes. In the KBBE’s dominant imaginary, environmental 
sustainability is translated into a benign eco-efficient productivity through resources which are 
renewable, reproducible and therefore sustainable; such resources become ‘biomass’ for flexible 
conversion to various industrial products. This imaginary has been elaborated by European Technology 
Platforms in the agri-food-forestry-biofuels sectors, whose proposals shape research priorities and 
policy agendas. Together these promote a further privatization and commodification of nature, 
especially by prioritizing knowledge that can extend intellectual property rights (Birch, Levidow and 
Papaioannou 2010).  
EU economic imaginaries have evolved over time, with tensions between early mercantilist 
versus later neoliberal forms, whereby the latter have facilitated integration of European capital into 
global capital as an essential route to competitiveness (van Apeldoorn 2002). Towards this aim, 
neoliberal policies have extended deregulation, privatization, public-private partnerships, intellectual 
property rights, etc., thus forcibly creating new market relations. In a European context, the political 
integration process was conceived as an opportunity to further open up the European region to the 
globalizing world economy and to accelerate the deregulation and privatization of the European 
economies, liberating market forces from the fetters of government intervention (van Apeldoorn 2000: 
166). 
These socio-technical and economic imaginaries are combined in ways shaping societal futures. 
Neoliberal imperatives – including private property rights, competition, market liberalization, etc., – are 
promoted as necessary means to facilitate beneficent technoscientific developments. Regardless of 
whether the latter materialize in commercial form, policy frameworks change institutions, thus shaping 
societal futures and resource usage along specific lines, while pre-empting alternatives: ‘If the model is 
too simple (as we have argued), the diagnosis and policy measures linked to it will not be productive – 
but will still shape society’ (Felt and Wynne 2007: 19). By drawing on the above concepts, let us 
examine the case of EU policy framework for promoting and justifying a larger market for biofuels.  
EU biofuel policy: Market drivers and techno-economic imaginaries 
Since the 1990s EU biofuels policy has featured three main justifications– economic advantage, energy 
security and greenhouse gas (GHG) savings – for promoting ‘sustainable’ technologies. The first two 
issues are discussed here and the third issue in the penultimate section below.  
According to many policy documents, biofuels offer more secure energy supplies for Europe, 
save greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to address global warming, and promote economic development 
in the rural places where they are produced (CEC 1997, 2001, EC 2003, Biofrac 2006). The meaning 
and relative weight of these arguments has changed over time, mainly in response to wider policy 
agendas and public dissent. From an early concern with energy security, commitments to the Kyoto 
Protocol became increasingly important, driving efforts to reduce GHG emissions (CEC 1997, 2000).  
The renewable energy sector has been expected to promote economic development through the 
creation of expert knowledge, renewable technologies and thus export opportunities for EU industries 
as ‘world leaders’ (CEC 1997: 4). In particular, second-generation biofuels are expected to ‘boost 
innovation and maintain Europe’s competitive position in the renewable energy sector’ (CEC 2007b).  
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For strategic advice on creating markets for biofuels, the European Commission established the 
Biofuels Research Advisory Council (Biofrac), representing industrial interests pursuing biofuel 
innovation. In its future vision, Biofrac claims that: ‘By 2030 the European Union covers as much as 
one fourth of its road transport fuel needs by clean and CO2-efficient biofuels.’ Such eco-efficiency 
will come from horizontally integrating agriculture with other industrial sectors: ‘Integrated 
biorefineries co-producing chemicals, biofuels and other forms of energy will be in full operation’ 
(Biofrac 2006: 16). Economic development is framed as newly created markets facilitating new 
sustainable technologies that will yield financial returns.  
An imaginary combining economic and environmental sustainability was elaborated in a policy 
report, An EU Strategy for Biofuels. The EU faces an opportunity for global leadership through 
technoscientific advance: 
In general, the production of biofuels could provide an opportunity to 
diversify agricultural activity, reduce dependence on fossil fuels 
(mainly oil) and contribute to economic growth in a sustainable 
manner. […] The options, which will be developed, need to be 
sustainable in economic, environmental and social terms, and bring the 
European industry to a leading position. (CEC 2006a: 6–7) 
Extending that imaginary, EU policy seeks to develop and maintain a competitive advantage for 
biofuel innovation in global markets. Second-generation biofuels are expected to ‘boost innovation and 
maintain Europe’s competitive position in the renewable energy sector’ (CEC 2007b: 11). According to 
the European Commission:  
By actively embracing the global trend towards biofuels and by 
ensuring their sustainable production, the EU can exploit and export its 
experience and knowledge, while engaging in research to ensure that 
we remain in the vanguard of technical developments (CEC 2006a: 5).  
In parallel, long-term market-based policy mechanisms could help 
achieve economies of scale and stimulate investment in ‘second 
generation’ technologies which could be more cost effective. (CEC 
2006b: 28) 
Energy insecurity was always another rationale for promoting biofuels. Use of transport fuel is 
expected to grow, to become more dependent on imports of fossil fuel, and thus to become less secure: 
‘there is a particular need for greenhouse gas savings in transport because its annual emissions are 
expected to grow by 77 million tonnes between 2005 and 2020 – three times as much as any other 
sector’. Consequently, ‘the only practical means’ to gain energy security is biofuels, along with 
efficiency measures in transport, argued the European Commission (CEC 2007b: 2, 7). This imperative 
was reiterated by DG Tren, the chef de file for energy policy: 
The sector is forecast to grow more rapidly than any other up to 2020 
and beyond. And the sector is crucial to the functioning of the whole 
economy. The importance and the vulnerability of the transport sector 
require that action is taken rapidly to reduce its malign contribution to 
sustainability and the insecurity of Europe’s energy supply. (DG Tren 
2009)  
Raw material for biofuels was originally meant to come from ‘indigenous’ sources, especially so 
that the EU could reduce its dependence on imports and so enhance its energy security (e.g. CEC 1997: 
4, CEC 2000, CEC 2006b). But prospective sources were later broadened to developing countries (e.g. 
CEC 2008). That shift responded to industry projections that half the EU biofuel supply could come 
from imports by 2030 (Biofrac 2006: 16). 
This imaginary naturalizes the increase in EU-wide transport as an objective force that must be 
accommodated. In practice, the increased demand for transport fuel has been driven by the internal 
market project and EU subsidy for transport infrastructure (Bowers 1993, Fairlie 1993). In that context, 
EU biofuel policy evades its own responsibility for unsustainable growth, especially by displacing the 
problem onto new technoscientific means to satisfy both market demands and environmental 
sustainability. However, public controversy eventually led to a political compromise in EU policy, 
linking high targets with sustainability criteria (see penultimate section).  
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Horizontally integrating value chains, extending commodity frontiers 
A biofuels market provides an opportunity to expand industrial agriculture on a global scale, facilitating 
technological innovation and extending commodity frontiers. This opportunity overlaps with a new 
policy agenda relaunching the Life Sciences as essential tools for a Knowledge-Based Bio-Economy 
(KBBE) (DG Research 2005). Although the KBBE has been defined in various ways, the dominant 
account presents natural resources as renewable biomass amenable to conversion into industrial 
products via a diversified biorefinery, thus horizontally integrating value chains and linking ecological 
efficiency with economic development (Becoteps 2011). That is, environmental sustainability becomes 
dependent upon markets to stimulate technological innovation. These imaginaries inform EU agendas 
for R&D funding.  
Biorefinery: Diversifying production from agro-industrial oil wells 
Funded by the European Commission, an international research network has developed research 
agendas around the biorefinery concept. Since 2006 it has aimed to design new generations of bio-based 
products derived from plant raw materials that will reach the market place ten to fifteen years later 
(EPOBIO 2006). Its bio-economy vision changes the role of agriculture, which becomes analogous to 
oil wells: 
It was noted by DOE [Dept of Energy] and E.U. that both the U.S. and 
E.U. have a common goal: Agriculture in the 21st century will become 
the oil wells of the future—providing fuels, chemicals and products for 
a global community. (BioMat Net 2006) 
As a primary means to extract and recompose valuable substances for a biorefinery, 
‘Biotechnology has the potential greatly to improve the production efficiency and the composition of 
crops and make feedstocks that better fit industrial needs’ (EPOBIO 2006: 8). 
The ‘diversified biorefinery’ takes biotechnology beyond first-generation GM crops to more 
novel ones. Since the 1980s genetic modification techniques have targeted four major crops—corn, 
soybeans, oilseed rape (canola) and cotton; the first three have been grown increasingly for animal feed. 
Now industry can use these crops to produce fuel, while also using the residue to produce animal feed 
and other industrial co-products. Even without GM crops as feedstock, biorefineries are being designed 
to diversify inputs and outputs, especially through novel enzymes and processing methods. According 
to a promotional account, renewable (and therefore sustainable) resources will generate by-products 
which become inputs for more energy production: 
The integrated diversified biorefinery—an integrated cluster of 
industries, using a variety of different technologies to produce 
chemicals, materials, biofuels and power from biomass raw materials 
agriculture—will be a key element in the future. And although the 
current renewable feedstocks are typically wood, starch and sugar, in 
future more complex by-products such as straw and even agricultural 
residues and households waste could be converted into a wide range of 
end products, including biofuels. (EuropaBio 2007: 6) 
This biorefinery vision poses the dual opportunity and imperative of linking diverse sectors along 
a value chain providing food, animal feed, energy, novel industrial products, etc. Agricultural raw 
materials become a universal renewable resource that can be used in more efficient ways, thus 
contributing to sustainability. According to the predecessor of the Biofuels Technology Platform, in the 
year 2020: 
Integrated biorefineries co-producing chemicals, biofuels and other 
forms of energy will be in full operation. The biorefineries will be 
characterised, at manufacturing scale, by an efficient integration of 
various steps, from handling and processing of biomass, fermentation in 
bioreactors, chemical processing, and final recovery and purification of 
the product. (Biofrac 2006: 16) 
To reap the benefits, e.g. green energy, society faces an objective imperative of horizontal 
integration across numerous industrial sectors: 
The production of green energy will also face the exceptional challenge 
of global industrial restructuring in which the very different value 
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chains of agricultural production and the biorefining industries must be 
merged with the value chains of the energy providers. (ETP Plants for 
the Future 2007: 33) 
This innovation agenda links major agricultural industries – e.g., seed, fertilizer, pesticide, 
commodities and biotechnology – with the energy sector, including the oil, power, and automotive 
industries. This imaginary foresees production systems as sustainable by using renewable resources, 
unlike fossil fuels. To better achieve this sustainable future, industry seeks a flexible horizontal 
integration by diversifying biomass sources and its potential uses. Their research priorities are promoted 
by various technology platforms, as invited and funded by the European Commission. In particular the 
European Biofuels Technology Platform advocates the following research aims:  
• Maximization of yield and crop resistance to biotic and abiotic factors (pests, diseases, water 
scarcity, rising temperatures, etc.). 
• Initiate innovative cropping systems to allow efficient, bulk material production for food, feed, 
fiber and fuel (4F agricultural systems). 
• Exploitation of marginal land options (EBTP 2008: SRA-24).  
The latter concept ‘marginal land’ imagines vast land tracts as surplus to food and other needs. In 
practice, this means land ‘marginal’ to global value chains, regardless of its importance to local 
populations. Through the concept of ‘marginal land’, investors imagine crop cultivation becoming 
lucrative via novel processes which can more efficiently extract and convert natural resources. 
According to an NGO critique, however:  
What’s seen as marginal land is often land used by marginalized 
people, by economically weaker sectors of communities, especially 
women. Much of it is communal land, collectively used by local people 
who might not have an individual land title, but for whom it is a vital 
resource for water, feed, food, medicines, fuel and other purposes. 
(Econexus 2009: 6) 
Thus the concept readily disguises new enclosures of arable land and rural populations.  
Beyond simply extracting more resources, these are imagined as cornucopian renewable 
substances, to be enhanced in quantity and market value by redesigning plants through new 
technologies. The Biofuels Technology Platform develops strategies to optimize valuable products from 
novel inputs. It requests funds to ‘[d]evelop new trees and other plant species chosen as energy and/or 
fiber sources, including plantations connected to biorefineries.’ For advanced biofuels, a biorefinery 
needs: ‘Ability to process a wide range of sustainable feedstocks while ensuring energy and carbon 
efficient process and selectivity towards higher added value products,’ e.g., specialty chemicals from 
novel inputs (EBTP 2008: SRA-23).  
Its precursor organization drew an analogy between plant material and crude oil: ‘New 
developments are ongoing for transforming the biomass into a liquid ‘biocrude’, which can be further 
refined, used for energy production or sent to a gasifier’ (Biofrac 2006: 21). The biocrude metaphor 
naturalizes the use and redesign of plants as functional substitutes for fossil fuels, and thus for 
horizontally integrating agriculture with other industries. Here an economic imaginary presents new 
technologies as market imperatives and opportunities, while a socio-technical imaginary presents 
markets as drivers of technoscientific progress. The neoliberal emphasis on markets frames the 
sustainability problem as a technical issue of accessing and optimizing renewable resources, i.e. 
decomposable biomass. For example, the prospect of (second generation) lignocellulosic fuels 
illustrates how market opportunities frame technical problems. Lignin in plant cell walls impedes their 
breakdown, thus limiting the use of the whole plant as biomass for various uses including energy. For 
agricultural, paper and biofuel feedstock systems, ‘lignin is considered to be an undesirable polymer’ 
(EPOBIO 2006: 27) – and so must be redesigned.  
Shaping and funding R&D agendas 
These imaginaries inform R&D agendas, especially via industry lobbies which favour biomass-to-liquid 
(BTL) fuel technology for several reasons. BTL offers links with other industries and export markets, as 
well as a potential basis for multiplying value chains. It also complements the existing transport 
infrastructure that is locked into liquid fuel technologies. According to the European Biofuels 
Technology Platform:  
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Liquid fuels are the preferred choice for road transport due to their 
relatively higher energy density and the fact that their use, particularly 
as blends, is more compatible with existing fuel distribution systems 
and requires little or no modification to power trains. (EBTP 2008: 
SRA-1) 
Substantial funds have therefore been allocated to R&D agendas focused on novel biofuels under 
the EU’s Framework Programme 7, in both the Energy and Agriculture programmes. Informed by 
industry’s priorities, the EU funded a joint call for proposals on ‘Sustainable Biorefineries’, initially 
offering €80m total grants. The overall programme has several aims which include: ‘enhancing energy 
efficiency, including by rationalizing use and storage of energy; addressing the pressing challenges of 
security of supply and climate change, whilst increasing the competitiveness of Europe’s industries’ 
(DG Research/Energy 2006: 4). For the latter aim, second-generation biofuels are expected to ‘boost 
innovation and maintain Europe’s competitive position in the renewable energy sector’ (CEC 2007a: 
11). In these ways, renewable energy is framed as more efficiently linking agriculture with energy for 
proprietary knowledge in global value chains.  
As grounds for greater R&D expenditure, industry has emphasized the closed-loop concept, in 
that wastes must be continually turned into raw materials for the next stage: ‘It will be necessary to 
optimize closed-loop cycles and biorefinery concepts for the use of wastes and residues in order to 
develop advanced biomass conversion technology’ (EBTP 2010: 7, 16). These novel value chains 
would depend on significant changes in inputs, processing methods, and outputs.  
A successful biorefinery would eventually depend on government subsidies for R&D&D – 
research and development and demonstration plants. According to speakers at the 2010 stakeholder 
meeting of the Biofuels Technology Platform, the necessary investment is too costly and commercially 
risky for the private sector, which therefore requests much more public funds to cover the risks. Testing 
commercial viability requires an expensive scale-up: ‘With an estimated budget of €8 billion over 10 
years, 15 to 20 demonstration and/or reference plants could be funded’ (EBTP 2010: 26). Indeed, 
without public funds, such research would not get done in the EU.  
As labelled by neoliberalism, this ‘market failure’ provides an important rationale for state 
intervention supporting new markets. From a critical perspective, such a policy illustrates how 
neoliberal strategy socializes risks (e.g. R&D costs) and privatizes benefits (e.g. resulting products). 
Despite the neoliberal rhetoric of freeing market forces, the public sector has been historically decisive 
in investing in financially risky new technologies. The effect is to subsidize the industry, socialize the 
cost and privatize the benefits (Block and Keller 2011).  
Along those lines, the Commission had already proposed such a large expenditure programme 
under the ‘sustainable bio-energy Europe initiative’, likewise favouring BTL conversion processes 
within diversified biorefineries (CEC 2009). The public sector faces a potentially enormous investment 
for a speculative promise – whose successful fulfilment would benefit specific private sectors, aided by 
indirect subsidy from EU targets and from national measures such as tax incentives. Future value chains 
depend upon the state funding technological scale-up, as well as creating market conditions to support 
this technoscientific innovation. Here again are overlapping economic and socio-technical imaginaries, 
together mobilizing public funds for private gain. 
However, BTL has faced much criticism as unsustainable. Biomass conversion into combined 
heat and power offers greater efficiency and GHG savings than BTL, according to a German report 
(SRU 2007). Indeed, ‘there are better ways to achieve greenhouse gas savings and security of supply 
enhancements than to produce biofuels. And … there are better uses for biomass in many cases’, 
according to an EC expert report (JRC 2008: 22).  
Moreover, according to an NGO, the Commission funds research agendas favouring ‘private 
interests’, e.g. agbiotech, GM trees, biofuels and processing techniques for their products. And 
‘promotion of agrofuel production in Latin America for the European market is likely to lead to further 
expansion of monocultures, destroying natural habitat and replacing small-scale farming systems’ (CEO 
2009). This criticism indicates a tension between environmental versus economic sustainability, and 
thus between different imaginaries. Since 2007 this tension has been highlighted by greater disputes 
over changes in land use.  
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Disputing sustainability, imagining a techno-fix 
By 2007 biofuel expansion was provoking worldwide controversy over various harmful effects, 
especially in the global South. Such effects include land grabs, deforestation, community dispossession, 
more chemical-intensive cultivation methods, etc. Many critics counterposed the term ‘agrofuel’, 
highlighting the threat it poses ‘because of the intensive, industrial way it is produced, generally as 
monocultures, often covering thousands of hectares, most often in the global South’. In response to US 
and EU targets, moreover, ‘the rapid development of agrofuel markets is encouraging investment in 
farming operations by the agrofuel industry, already prospecting developing countries for suitable land 
for energy crops’ (Econexus et al. 2007: 6, 22). For several years, Greens in the European Parliament 
had been promoting biofuels, but now they more clearly sought to exclude food crops and restrict the 
biomass source to waste materials that would otherwise have no use (Lipietz 2008).  
To undermine the EU’s proposal for mandatory targets, critics emphasized the ‘carbon debt’ that 
results from directly ploughing up forests or grasslands for newly cultivated land. This generates 
enormous GHG emissions, equivalent to decades of substituting biofuels for fossil fuels. Beyond direct 
changes in land use, indirect changes can result from crop substitution across the globe. For example, as 
the EU’s leading biofuel user, Germany draws on domestic or Eastern European sources of oilseed 
rape; its former food uses generate extra imports of palm oil from more distant sources, especially from 
Indonesia, where new plantations destroy forests.  
In such ways, biofuel production displaces food crops to other places, where a once-off 
destruction of forest or peatland releases enormous GHG; this ‘carbon debt’ undermines the GHG 
savings from biofuels (Fargione et al. 2008, Searchinger 2008). Controversy ensued over the extent of 
such effects, called ‘indirect land-use changes’ (ILUC). Land-use change became NGO arguments 
against the Commission’s proposal for a 10% biofuels target by 2020, to be formalized in a new 
Directive (see next section).  
However, these criticisms were turned into an extra argument for pursuing a techno-fix: that is, 
high targets were necessary to simulate biofuel innovation that would minimize environmental 
destruction. According to a research network funded by the European Commission: 
At a time when the expansion of first-generation biofuels derived from 
food crops is causing concern and in some sectors of the public active 
opposition related to questions of sustainability and competition with 
food, more emphasis has to be placed on second-generation biofuels 
(Coombs 2007: 17). 
Future novel biofuels are variously described as ‘second-generation,’ ‘next-generation,’ 
‘advanced,’ etc. They would use non-food parts of plants, or non-food plants such as grasses, or even 
algae, as means to avoid extra pressure on fertile arable land. As an extra basis for eco-efficiency, such 
innovations are expected to use ‘marginal land’ for growing novel non-food crops and to turn ‘bio-
waste’ into energy. Such resources are seen as ‘under-utilized’ or ‘under-valued’, i.e. resources 
otherwise contributing little to markets.  
‘Marginal land’ would allow novel biofuels to avoid the damage caused by current ones, 
according to the Trade Commissioner who was also promoting global trade liberalization:  
We have all seen the maps showing the vast tracts of land that would be 
required to replace petrol to any significant degree. That is why 
research and development into second generation biofuels that are 
cleaner, more versatile, and can be used on more marginal land is so 
important. (Mandelson 2007) 
The European Commission’s unit which assists developing countries foresees a similar remedy: 
‘The use of technology must improve production efficiency and social and environmental performance 
in all stages of the biofuel value chain’, as a means to avoid competition for land use (EuropeAid 2009). 
Numerous policy documents imagine that ‘marginal land’ is abundantly available for biofuel crops, i.e. 
that this novel use would make cultivation economically viable but without undermining other land uses 
(Franco et al. 2010).  
Such arguments have provided a rationale for EU biofuel targets – as essential incentives for 
investment in technological development bringing next-generation biofuels, in turn solving the 
problems created by the first generation. These expectations for a techno-fix assume or imply that 
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inefficient resource usage causes the sustainability problems of current biofuels. With sufficient market 
incentives, furthermore, the techno-fix is meant to resolve these issues.  
Mandating biofuels targets, stimulating innovation, accounting for carbon 
When the global biofuel controversy erupted in 2007, the EU already had voluntary targets for ‘biofuels 
or other renewable fuels for transport’ and was discussing proposals to make them mandatory. At its 
March 2007 meeting the EU Council reiterated support for mandatory targets – subject to biofuel 
production being sustainable and second-generation biofuels becoming commercially available. The 
Commission’s legislative proposal eventually emphasized ‘renewable energy’ for transport fuel, thus 
downplaying biofuels (CEC 2008). As a basis for formalizing and legitimizing mandatory EU targets, 
warnings about unsustainable biofuels were translated into debates over sustainability criteria. 
Environmental issues were reduced to ‘carbon stock’ levels and GHG emissions which could be readily 
calculated, at least for direct changes in land use; other environmental issues were marginalized.  
In the debate over sustainability criteria for 2020 targets, each stakeholder group sought to shape 
or limit a biofuel market in different ways. The biofuels industry supported high targets with stringent 
criteria for GHG savings, especially as means to stimulate R&D for future novel biofuels and to 
guarantee a market for them. Agriculture Ministries generally supported the high targets, especially as 
an extra support for farmers – but not the stringent criteria for GHG savings, which would exclude most 
biofuels then being produced in Europe. Environmental NGOs called for lower targets, thus seeking to 
minimize imports from the global South, as well as stringent criteria to protect environments and 
livelihoods there.  
All the above arguments and pressures converged in a political compromise, the 2009 Renewable 
Energy Directive (RED), whose mandatory targets aimed to stimulate investment. The preamble 
emphasized ‘opportunities for establishing economic growth through innovation and a sustainable 
competitive energy policy’; in particular, ‘mandatory targets should provide the business community 
with the long-term stability it needs to make rational, sustainable investments in the renewable energy 
sector’ (EC 2009: 16, 17).  
Towards the policy aims, 20% of all energy must come from renewable sources (including 
biomass, bioliquids and biogas) by the year 2020. Likewise, 10% of total transport fuel must come from 
renewable energy. Sustainability criteria define which biofuels qualify for the targets: greenhouse gas 
savings must rise from 35% to 50% in 2016 for existing production and to 60% for new installations in 
2017. At the time the RED was enacted, the future 60% criterion was fulfilled only by Brazilian 
bioethanol.  
The RED incorporates wider assumptions about resource conflicts resulting from inefficiency, to 
be remedied through market-like incentives. GHG savings are double-counted for several categories: 
co-products which could be used for other energy sources or animal feed; wastes and residues, 
assuming that they have no other use; and advanced biofuels from non-edible material, assuming that 
the GHG emissions can be assigned to the edible parts. Together those bonuses were meant to reward 
and stimulate novel biofuels using non-edible plant material, wastes, etc. and/or generating more co-
products. The latter are presumed to reduce pressures on land, as if the market were finite: ‘Co-products 
normally replace animal feed, freeing up land that would otherwise be needed for its production’ (CEC 
2010: 13). In this imaginary, statutory incentives will stimulate new markets that drive technoscientific 
innovation towards reducing pressures on natural resources. 
Industry expectations for market incentives have led to some disappointment. As it turns out, the 
bonus in GHG savings favours cheap waste materials as feedstock and advanced biofuels whose 
production cost is similar to first-generation biofuels. This advantage deters investment in more 
expensive advanced biofuels, especially those needing novel enzymes. So the RED criteria create a 
‘market distortion’, complains a biofuel representative (Vierhout 2011). Paradoxically, state rules are 
blamed for creating the wrong type of market and thus distorting a market – which would otherwise not 
exist. As this complaint reveals, official environmental aims help to justify the fundamental, less 
explicit aim of subsidizing and creating new markets.  
The RED specifies adverse changes in land use which would preclude ‘sustainable biofuels’. 
Producers should avoid ‘the conversion of high-carbon-stock land that would prove to be ineligible for 
producing raw materials for biofuels and bioliquids’ (EC 2009: 24). Environmental criteria disqualified 
any biomass sources from ‘highly biodiverse’, ‘primary forest’ and ‘continuously forested’ areas; the 
latter were defined by statistical criteria. Compliance will be assessed on the basis of company 
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information, or through voluntary certification schemes or bilateral and multilateral agreements (EC 
2009).  
Indirect land use change (ILUC) has remained controversial. Some environmental NGOs and 
Green MEPs proposed to include an extra calculation within the sustainability criteria. Instead the issue 
was deferred: under the RED, by December 2010 the Commission must report on ways to calculate 
ILUC and to minimize its impact (EC 2009, see end of this section for outcome in CEC 2010).  
Also at issue was social sustainability. A Parliamentary committee had proposed that 
sustainability criteria should include social aspects, e.g. land rights of local communities and fair 
remuneration of workers. But these criteria were ultimately excluded, partly on grounds that they would 
contravene WTO rules on trade barriers (EP Envi 2008, Biofuelwatch et al. 2008). ‘These directives do 
not include mandatory social criteria (labour conditions, land tenure, etc.), nor food security criteria, 
because of the difficulty to verify the link between individual biofuel consignments and the respect of 
these particular criteria’, according to a Commission development agency (EuropeAid 2009: 2). Indeed, 
complex trade flows leave no one responsible for harmful consequences.  
Novel future biofuels were meant contribute significantly to the 10% target, yet these 
expectations were soon contradicted by the aggregate National Renewable Energy Action Plans 
(NREAPs). Their implications were analysed in a NGOs’ joint report which was ominously entitled, 
Driving to Destruction. According to its analysis, conventional biofuels would contribute up to 92% of 
total predicted biofuel use, representing 8.8% of the total energy in transport by 2020. Moreover, ‘72% 
of this demand is anticipated to be met through the use of biodiesel and 28% from bioethanol’ (Bowyer 
2010: 2) – significant because biodiesel causes relatively greater harm than bioethanol via ILUC effects.  
On that basis, the NGOs’ report questioned the 10% target. They warned that emissions from 
ILUC will be ‘80.5 to 166.5% worse than would be delivered from continued reliance on fossil fuels in 
the transport sector’, especially as the EU uses more biodiesel. ‘Moreover, it also raises urgent 
questions about the appropriateness of projected levels of conventional biofuel use by Member States in 
2020’ (Bowyer 2010: 2). Several NGOs warned that many decades or even centuries may be needed to 
repay the ‘carbon debt’. Meanwhile this debt is concealed by ‘carbon laundering’ through statutory 
criteria which account only for direct changes in land use (Birdlife International 2010).  
In response to the ILUC controversy, the Commission held a public consultation (DG Energy 
2010). NGOs argued that ILUC effects warrant more stringent sustainability criteria, in order to justify 
the 10% target as environmentally beneficial. Industry argued that available ILUC models suffer from 
methodological weaknesses, thus providing no basis for extra regulatory measures. And industry 
warned that such measures would jeopardize biofuel investment (ILUC 2010).  
Afterwards the Commission left open its future policy options. Its report reiterated the EU’s 
beneficent expectations for future technological innovation, which depends on incentives for private-
sector investment:  
Biofuels are important because they help tackle two of the most 
fundamental challenges in energy policy with regards to transport: the 
overwhelming dependency of the transport sector for oil and the need to 
decarbonise transport. Supporting biofuels offers other opportunities 
too. They can contribute to employment in rural areas, both in the EU 
and in developing countries and they offer scope for technological 
development, for example in second-generation biofuels. […] In this 
context the stable and predictable investment climate created by the 
Renewable Energy Directive […] needs to be preserved. (CEC 2010: 2, 
14) 
In this circular reasoning, echoing industry stances, EU policy must maintain profit-seeking 
incentives to generate future innovation alleviating the harm caused by current markets. Industry 
expectations to profit from future innovation, combining socio-technical and economic imaginaries, 
supersede governments’ acknowledgement that advanced biofuels will make little contribution by 2020.  
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Conclusion: Neoliberalizing technoscience and environment 
Let us return to the original focus — how EU biofuels policy: 
• stimulates new markets for knowledge as well as resources; 
• conceptualizes and designs markets as a driver of beneficent innovation; and thus  
• deepens links between technoscience and neoliberalism.  
EU biofuels policy promotes a vision of a feasible, desirable future Europe constituted by 
economic and socio-technical imaginaries. Namely, market-driven innovation will generate 
‘competitive, sustainable biofuels’ within a wider Knowledge-Based Bio-Economy (KBBE). This will 
achieve a benign eco-efficient productivity using resources which are renewable, reproducible and 
therefore sustainable: such resources (especially non-food biomass) will replace fossil fuels. Future 
biofuel production will efficiently use renewable resources to enhance energy security, economic 
competitiveness, technology export and GHG savings – aims which already drive innovation, according 
to the imaginary.  
As a key imperative for biofuels, EU policy foresees greater future demand for oil imports and 
thus energy insecurity, as if this were an objective external force. In practice, such pressures result from 
long-standing market-based policies (e.g. transport infrastructure, internal market, trade liberalization, 
etc.) throwing people and products into greater competition with each other. In this neoliberal context, 
EU biofuels policy naturalizes energy insecurity, which is attributed to external pressures such as oil 
dependence. Likewise greater pressures on land and natural resources are naturalized; they are 
attributed to global market demand, as if this were external to the production system for food, feed and 
energy. Within those problem-definitions, biofuels are promoted as a multi-purpose remedy, which can 
be characterized as a technological fix: future efficiency improvements will sustainably expand biofuel 
production, while minimizing demands on natural resources. This agenda promotes new markets for 
natural resources, while discursively naturalizing those markets as rooted in biological characteristics 
and objective imperatives.  
That relationship between neoliberalism and technoscience seems to shape the EU policy 
framework. To construct new markets for biofuels, EU policy has two complementary means: biofuel 
targets and R&D subsidy, which can be summarized as follows. As a statutory target, 10% of transport 
fuels must come from renewable energy by 2020 under the 2009 RED. The target mandates a 
significant market which otherwise would hardly exist, in the name of environmental benefits. These 
markets are regulated by sustainability criteria, incorporating only those issues which can be calculably 
reduced to carbon accounting. Through profit-seeking incentives and standards, the RED aims to 
stimulate investment and innovation to fulfil the target, eventually through more sustainable biofuels to 
comply with stricter standards for installations built after 2017. In practice, the draft RED was already 
stimulating land grabs anticipating opportunities to supply new EU markets.  
In parallel, industry promotes research agendas for horizontally integrating agriculture with other 
industries, including energy production, especially through an integrated biorefinery. Its agenda favours 
biomass-to-liquid technologies, which offer various prospects for privatizing knowledge, as a central 
feature of the broader Knowledge-Based Economy agenda (cf. Jessop 2005). R&D agendas redesign 
nature for real subsumption to capital accumulation (cf. Boyd, Prudham and Schurman 2001), e.g. by 
changing cell-wall composition for easier breakdown or entire plants for high-value substances. At the 
same time, industry requests enormous subsidy on grounds that the financial risks of early-stage 
development are too great for private investors. The EU’s Framework Programme 7 has incorporated 
these neoliberal imaginaries into research priorities, e.g. for ‘sustainable biorefineries’.  
As an economic imaginary around biorefineries, ‘value chains’ help to mobilize political, 
financial and organizational investment for biofuels R&D. New cross-sectoral industry coalitions 
imagine an economic community gaining together from future technological development. Given 
various competing interests, intra-EU rivalry for global capital integration is represented as ‘European 
competitiveness’, as if Europe were a unitary interest (cf. Rosamond 2002).  
R&D anticipates a diversified biorefinery integrating agriculture with other industrial sectors. 
Investors seek an advantageous position in future global value chains from agriculture, seen as new ‘oil 
wells’ whose biomass can be ‘cracked’ and recomposed into more valuable components. Future 
biofuels are also promoted as an opportunity for European technology export, e.g. agri-inputs and 
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biomass processing techniques which can be patented. In these ways, the ‘value chains’ concept 
combines economic imaginaries with socio-technical imaginaries to stimulate new investments.  
These imaginaries extend a cornucopian vision of resources for lucrative biomass, especially via 
its redesign, diversification and recomposition for multiple uses. Vast areas are imagined as ‘marginal 
land’, unnecessary for food production and so benignly available for agro-industrial systems. This 
concept helps to justify EU targets which stimulate changes in land use, despite causing environmental 
destruction and dispossessing local populations. These changes exemplify capital accumulation by 
dispossession (Harvey 2003), whereby investors gain access to cheap human and natural resources at 
new commodity frontiers (Moore 2010).  
EU targets have remained contentious, for several reasons. The market drivers of harm have been 
highlighted by many NGO critics, thus politicizing EU targets. These stimulate harmful land-use 
changes, especially in in the global South. Despite expectations and incentives for novel biofuels, nearly 
the entire 10% target by the year 2020 will come from conventional biofuels, thus stimulating direct and 
indirect changes in land use. These create an enormous ‘carbon debt’, which plausibly undermines 
GHG savings and renders most biofuels ‘unsustainable’, thus contradicting the official environmental 
rationale. Indirect land-use change (ILUC) has been deferred from any statutory rules, which fall within 
the standard disciplines of trade liberalization, thus imposing a great burden of evidence to justify any 
extra ‘discriminatory’ criteria.  
Meanwhile the EU biofuel controversy has been channelled into disputes over carbon accounting 
and its methodological difficulties in predicting environmental effects. Those difficulties are turned into 
policy deference to neoliberal imperatives, especially an ‘investment climate’ for market competition, 
as the implicit knowledge-base for technological solutions (cf. Lave, Mirowski and Randalls 2010), 
thus depoliticizing EU targets. In such ways, environmentalism has been incorporated into models of 
market progress, as a more effective neoliberal strategy than simply disregarding environmental issues 
(cf. McCarthy and Prudham 2004).  
In all those ways, EU biofuel policy illustrates the joint neoliberalization of technoscience and 
the environment. Through circular reasoning, incentives for profit-seeking investment must be 
maintained in order eventually to achieve the 10% target, in innovative ways avoiding the harm caused 
by current biofuels. Such incentives are meant to generate ‘competitive, sustainable biofuels’ – by 
stimulating technoscience, regulating its forms or direction, distributing its societal benefits and 
optimizing resource usage. In practice, EU targets stimulate capital accumulation by socio-economic 
dispossession and more GHG emissions; more ‘efficient’ innovations may provide even greater 
incentives. Official environmental aims help to justify the less explicit aim of subsidizing and creating 
new markets.  
This agenda is depoliticized as a benign, omniscient market – justified and guided by 
sustainability criteria – as the most efficient mechanism to achieve environmental goals. Any political 
accountability is reduced to carbon accounting, in turn relegated to specialists, while marginalizing 
other knowledges. Thus the EU policy framework facilitates plunder and commoditization of natural 
resources – in the name of conserving them, perhaps like neoliberalization processes in general. 
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